



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

April 29, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO: REAR ADMIRAL STASER HOLCOMB  
MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MR. BENJAMIN EVANS  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MR. ALBERT M. CHRISTOPHER  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Secretary Blumenthal's Conversation with  
George Arbatov

Herewith, for the information of your principals, is  
a copy of the memorandum of Secretary Blumenthal's recent  
conversation with George Arbatov.

Ann Morgan  
Acting Deputy Executive Secretary

Attachment

TREA has not reviewed. Processed IAW CIA TREA arrangement letter dtd  
4/11/08.

DHS review completed.

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

April 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: George Arbatov, Director of the  
Institute of U.S. Status of  
Academies of Sciences of the Soviet  
Union

1. SALT

Arbatov said that the strongly adverse reaction of the Soviet side to the U.S. proposals was partly due to surprise, because the numbers were considered such a drastic departure from what had been expected and appeared heavily weighted in favor of the U.S. The Soviets suspected that we were out to gain a major advantage over them and there was even suspicion that perhaps no real agreement was desired by us. In support of the notion that we were seeking a major advantage, he referred to our proposal relating to the cruise missile.

Arbatov also said that he thought a mistake had been made in the manner of presentation. If the basic principles underlying the new U.S. approach had been presented for discussion first, leaving the numbers for later and providing an opportunity to discuss these principles and allow the Soviet side to get used to them, the outcome might have been more positive.

Emphasizing that Salt and Disarmament were not an area in which I was competent to speak, I assured him that I knew at first-hand that the President's desire was not to complicate Soviet-U.S. negotiations nor to gain major one-sided advantages for the U.S., but that it represented a genuine desire on his part to work for a break-through, leading to really important reductions in arms for both sides. I said I was sure that the President understands that this must be done on the basis of a balance of commitments and that one-sided concessions were unlikely to be achieved. I then asked about possible next steps.

He said that he had been thinking about this and he thought perhaps the problem was too big to be handled all at once; that a better approach might be to break it into several parts. Possibly an acceptance and reaffirmation of Vladivostok might form the first part of an agreement, this being linked to a concomitant agreement on the goals of the next step involving a substantial reduction on a balanced basis. It might also include an agreement on a framework on which to reach these goals and perhaps the principles underlying the next phase of the negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

Memorandum of Conversation  
Page 2

April 26, 1977

Arbatov also thought that we were suggesting too many things to be tied into one negotiation. He mentioned specifically agreements relating to the Indian Ocean. He thought it was a related, but nevertheless separate, issue and ought to be negotiated separately.

As to procedure, he said that if the Secretary of State were to press our ideas or present new ones with Gromyko at Vienna, Gromyko would be in difficulty because it deals with matters he cannot decide alone. Arbatov suggested that there might be some presentation of new ideas and approaches at lower levels, two or three weeks ahead of Geneva. This would give Moscow some time to consider them so that there could be a better discussion with the Secretary of State at Geneva.

2. HUMAN RIGHTS

On the relation to Salt, he said that there was no clear relationship but our emphasis on the Human Rights issue does complicate matters in his view. Specifically, "If proposals you make are fully acceptable, we would accept them in spite of your Human Rights position. If your proposals are fully unacceptable, we would reject them even without your Human Rights position. But matters do not present themselves in this way, they always require compromise and negotiation. In that situation, your emphasis on Human Rights has created a strained atmosphere and makes compromise and negotiation more difficult."

Upon my assurance that our emphasis on Human Rights represented a basic commitment by the American people to this notion, a notion which is not directed against any particular country, he said that he was willing to believe me but that many of his colleagues did not. In his view, he said matters were complicated by a number of other actions by the U.S. which have aroused suspicion in the Soviet mind. One of these is our renewed support for Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, including the providing of additional funds to build new transmitters. It raises the pressure for a renewal of jamming for the Soviet side. He also mentioned the reception of Bukovsky and the letter to Sakharov as irritants. "What if we had received in the Soviet Union, or written laudatory letters, to the people at Wounded Knee?" I replied that I didn't think that would cause President Carter great concern. He answered that though this might be true many American people would be offended and that was the problem faced by the Soviet Government.

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

Memorandum of Conversation

Page 3

April 26, 1977

Basically, his pleas in the Human Rights area seemed to be that we tone down the level of our statements and show some understanding for their difficulty in moving too fast in this area. He said the issue had recently been discussed by a commission of the Supreme Soviet. He discovered, to his surprise, that there were only 6 political prisoners in psychiatric wards and only a little more than 150 political prisoners in jail. (Sic!)

3. U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS

He was cautious about the next steps for the U.S.-Soviet Joint Economic and Commercial Commission and said he recognized that progress on Jackson-Vanik, while essential, might not be possible unless there were progress on Salt and on the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. I agreed that this was probably true.

Arbatov said that he felt a meeting in June might be a good idea and that he assumed I would be discussing it with Ambassador Dobrynin. He expressed the view that, while a commitment to work for the elimination of Jackson-Vanik might be too much to expect at this time, there should be at least an indication of basic intentions. The main thing to be avoided would be to have a useless meeting -- one considered a failure on both sides. "We don't need another source of irritation and failure at this time."

4. IMMIGRATION

I asked about progress on Jewish immigration. He said it was his impression that 98.4% of those who apply are eventually let out. The total annual number is about 20,000, he thought. This is less than the 35,000 previously leaving the country, but he thought this was only natural since the back-log had now been worked down. If we worked quietly, further progress could be made. The main fear and the main threat to be avoided was that of hardening the lines, so as to avoid a strong reaction and a tightening up again with the Soviet Union.

  
W. Michael Blumenthal

WMB:la

cc: Secretary of State  
Dr. Z. Brzezinski

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Approved For Release 2008/09/18 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010021-8

## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	D/DCI/IC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI		✓		
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20	D/EE0				
21	C/S&T/SS		✓		
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

3637 (7-76)

Executive Secretary

Date

25X1

TREASURY DEPARTMENT THE *Treasury*

Approved For Release 2008/09/18 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010021-8